Security & guardrails𝕏 sourced
The agent never sees the API key
Box OpenCode in Kata containers and inject API keys at the proxy. Security-minded developer.
what to steal
Inject credentials at an egress proxy so a compromised agent can't leak them.
Our takeaway from the source, not a quote.
codefault-opencode-kata-egress.toml
# Box OpenCode in Kata containers and inject API keys at the proxy # source: https://x.com/Code_Fault/status/2110221511063679359 [rig] who = "Security-minded developer" author = "Caleb Burns (@Code_Fault)" date = "2026-10-14" harness = ["OpenCode"] models = [] [keep] - OpenCode inside a Docker container on the Kata runtime - Egress restricted with iron-proxy - iron-proxy MitM-injects API credentials [cut] - Keys in the agent environment
| thing | status | why (per source) |
|---|---|---|
| Keys in the agent environment | removed | Credentials are injected at the proxy |
Source: https://x.com/Code_Fault/status/2110221511063679359 · checked 2026-10-14
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